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§ 2.1. Using Reverse Stock Splits to Eliminate Minority Shareholders.* 
Since the mid-1970's, many publicly held companies have eliminated 
public ownership of the company's stock and have continued to conduct 
business as closely held companies. 1 This process, known as "going 
private, "2 is a particular type of "squeeze out" of minority shareholders. 3 
Public companies go private for several reasons. 4 The most significant 
reason of which is to eliminate the cost of compliance with the Securities 
t William E. Martin, David M. Rievman, Dorothy Whelan. 
*William E. Martin, Stl1ff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 2.1. 1 See generally Mayerson & Crawford, Fairness to Minority Shareholders in 
"Going Private" Transactions: A Growing Concern, 67 ILL. B.J. 484, 484 (1979); Note, 
Going Private: An Analysis of Federal and State Remedies, 44 FoRDHAM L. REV. 796, 796 
(1976) [hereinafter Note, Federal and State Remedies]. 
2 Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903, 903 (1975). 
3 F. H. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS 
§ 5:27 (2d ed.). Otlter types of minority squeeze outs are: (I) squeeze outs in a closely held 
company; (2) squeeze outs that are a part of a two-step acquisition involving two previously 
unrelated companies; and (3) a parent corporation's acquisition of minority interests in a 
long term subsidiary. ld. 
Commentators distinguish "going private" transactions from other types of minority 
squeeze outs. See, e.g., Brudney & Chirlstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 
87 YALE L.J. 1354, 1367 (1978)(the fiduciary principle suggests that "going private" trans-
actions should in all cases be prohibited). The Securities and Exchange Commission also 
distinguishes "going private" transactions from other squeeze out transactions and has 
adopted Rule 13e-3 to regulate companies which are going private. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 
(1985). Rule 13e-3 requires a company to disclose information about the transaction and 
also includes an anti-fraud provision. ld. For a discussion of possible relief for minority 
shareholders under federal securities law see, F. H. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 
3, at § 5:36. 
4 Mayerson & Crawford, supra note 1, at 484. 
!d. 
By going private a parent company may obtain full control over a subsidiary at a 
time when the subsidiary's stock is depressed. A corporation may avoid a takeover. 
Corporate procedures may be simplified. Conflicts of interests between subsidiaries 
or problems with uncooperative minority shareholders may be eliminated .... [T]he 
majority shareholders may [also] wish to rid the corporation of the expense and 
formalities of continued public status. 
Such transactions may also benefit the minority shareholders who may be given 
a market for what otherwise would be an illiquid stock. 
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and Exchange Act of 1934.5 By reducing the number of shareholders to 
below 300, the company's SEC registration under section 12 terminates, 
and the company no longer need file several reports. 6 
Publicly held companies sometimes use a "reverse stock split" to go 
private.7 In a reverse stock split the shareholders amend the company's 
articles of organization to dramatically reduce the number of authorized 
and outstanding shares, leaving mh10rity shareholders with only frac-
tional shares.8 In lieu of issuing fractional shares, the company pays the 
minority shareholders cash for their fractional shares, and thus effectively 
eliminates the minority shareholders.9 
Only two courts have addressed whether state business corporation 
statutes permit companies to use a reverse stock split to eliminate public 
ownership. In Teschner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 10 the Illinois Su-
preme Court upheld a corporation's use of a reverse stock split to elim-
inate a minority shareholder's interest in the defendant corporation. 11 In 
5 Dykstra, The Reverse Stock Split- That Other Means of Going Private, 53 CHI. [-] 
KENT L. REV. I, 2 (1976). 
6 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(1)(g)(4), 78(o)(d) (1982). See Dykstra, supra note 5, at 2 & n.5; Note, 
Federal and State Remedies, supra note I, at 797. By going private, companies can 
eliminate $75,000 to $200,000 of annual expenses related to compliance with the federal 
securities Jaws. /d. at 797 n.9. 
7 Dykstra, supra note 5, at 2-3. Companies use other tactics to go private more frequently 
than a reverse stock split. /d. In order of probable frequency of use, the methods available 
to return a public company to private status are: 
/d. 
(I) A cash tender offer by the issuer, its management, or an affiliated entity; (2) a 
merger or consolidation of the issuer with, or the sale of its assets to, another 
corporation controlled by management of the issuer; (3) an exchange offer (almost 
always involving a debt security) by the issuer, its management or an affiliated entity; 
and (4) a reverse stock split. 
8 /d. at 3. 
As an illustration [of a reverse stock split], Jet us assume that a corporation's [articles 
of organization] authorize[s] the issuance of I ,000,000 shares of common stock, with 
a par value of $.01 per share, all of which are currently outstanding. Further assume 
that these shares are held by 750 shareholders, of whom only 15 hold 1000 shares 
or more. The corporation then amends its [articles of organization] so as to authorize 
the issuance of only 1000 shares of common stock, with a par value of $10.00 per 
share. As a result, each share existing before the amendment is reclassified into 11 
1000 of a share following the amendment; every shareholder who held fewer than 
1000 old shares now will have Jess than one full share, or a fractional share. Finally, 
in lieu of issuing fractional shares to these holders, the corporation, as it is permitted 
to do under most state statutes, pays them cash for their fractional holdings. The 
result of the amendment, then, is a reduction of the number of the corporation's 
shareholders from 750 to 15 - it has gone private. 
/d. at 3-4. 
9 /d. 
' 0 59 Ill. 2d 452, 322 N.E.2d 54 (1974), appeal dismissed, 422 U.S. 1002 (1975). 
11 /d. at 457, 322 N.E.2d at 57. Teschner, however, did not involve a "going private" 
2
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Clark v. Pattern Analysis and Recognition Corp., 12 a New York trial 
court granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting a corporation from 
issuing a reverse stock split which would have returned the corporation 
to private statusY The New York court held that a majority shareholder 
must establish a "strong and compelling legitimate business purpose" in 
order to eliminate minority shareholders by using a reverse stock split. 14 
Thus, in New York, while reverse stock splits are not per se invalid, the 
burden of proof is on the corporation to show a legitimate business 
purpose for using a reverse stock split. 15 
During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court, in Leader v. 
Hycor, Inc., 16 addressed two issues regarding a reverse stock split. First, 
the Supreme Judicial Court considered whether a publicly held company, 
for the purpose of going private, may use a reverse stock split to eliminate 
minority shareholders. 17 The Court held that a company may use a re-
verse stock split to go private. 18 The plan at issue in Leader, according 
to the Court, complied with the relevant provisions of the Massachusetts 
Corporation Law, and, furthermore, approval of the plan by the majority 
transaction because the majority shareholders had already acquired the shares of all but 95 
minority shareholders through an exchange offer. Jd. at 454, 322 N.E.2d at 55. In Teschner, 
the majority shareholder, Lincoln National Corporation, eventually acquired 99.9% of the 
outstanding shares of Chicago Title & Trust Co. through an exchange offer and cash 
purchases of minority shareholders' stock. /d. In order to "reduce corporate expenses and 
simplify and facilitate procedures," the majority used a reverse stock split to eliminate the 
.01% shareholder. Jd. at 459, 322 N.E.2d at 58. The plaintiff, Mrs. Teschner, challenged 
the stock split as a violation of her constitutional right to due process and equal protection 
of the laws, as well as an unconstitutional impairment of her contractual rights. /d. at 458, 
322 N.E.2d at 57. The Teschner Court dismissed these arguments, noting that the statutes 
which authorize the making of corporate changes by majority vote have been upheld in 
many cases. Jd. at 456-57, 322 N.E.2d at 56-57. 
The Teschner Court, however, limited its holding to the immediate facts. Id. at 457, 322 
N.E.2d at 57. The Court stated, "[w]e do not say that under all circumstances minority 
shareholders will be denied relief when the majority has proceeded under the provisions of 
the [Illinois Business Corporations Act] .... " Jd. One commentator, who was a member 
of the law firm representing the defendants in the Teschner case, has suggested that Mrs. 
Teschner would have had a better chance of prevailing if she had alleged that there was 
no valid business purpose for the reverse stock split or that the price paid for her shares 
was unfairly low. Dykstra, supra note 5, at 19. 
12 87 Misc. 2d 385, 384 N.Y.S.2d, 660 (1976). 
13 Id. at 391, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 665. 
14 Jd. 
15 /d. The Clark court distinguished Teschner by noting that the plaintiff in Teschner did 
not allege wrongdoing in her complaint and the Illinois Supreme Court did not discover 
any evidence of an improper purpose in the company's use of the reverse stock split. ld. 
at 389, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 664. 
16 395 Mass. 215, 479 N.E.2d 173 (1985). 
17 Jd. at 219-23, 479 N.E.2d at 176-78. 
18 Jd. at 221, 479 N.E.2d at 177. 
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shareholders did not constitute a breach of their fiduciary duty to the 
plaintiff shareholders. 19 Second, the Supreme Judicial Court considered 
the fairness of the redemption price. 20 On the record before it, the Court 
could not determine, however, whether the five dollar per share redemp-
tion price was fair and reasonable. 21 Accordingly, the Court remanded 
the case so that the superior court judge could give a more detailed 
account of the facts on which he based his conclusion that the redemption 
price was fair and reasonable. 22 
The corporate defendant in Leader, Hycor, Inc. ("Hycor") was a Mas-
sachusetts corporation organized in 1967 by the five individual defendants 
who, along with their families, owned the majority shares of Hycor 
stock. 23 The defendant shareholders also were employed by Hycor and 
each was a member of its board of directors.24 Immediately prior to the 
recapitalization plan at issue in Leader, these shareholders owned 81% 
of the outstanding Hycor stock. 25 Three hundred thirty-one individuals 
owned the remaining shares of Hycor stock. 26 
On February 4, 1980, the individual defendants, acting as Hycor's 
Board of Directors, mailed a notice of a special shareholders' meeting 
scheduled for February 13, 1980, for the purpose of voting on a recapi-
talization planY The notice described the terms of the proposal and 
19 /d. at 219-23, 479 N.E.2d at 176-78. Relying on Clark v. Pattern Analysis and Rec-
ognition Corp., 87 Misc. 2d 385, 384 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1976), the Supreme Judicial Court 
noted that "[d]espite apparent compliance with statutory requirements, a transaction such 
as the one at issue is still subject to judicial scrutiny [when there is a claim of a breach of 
fiduciary duty and unfairness]." Leader, 395 Mass. at 221, 479 N.E.2d at 177. 
20 /d. at 223-24, 479 N.E.2d at 178-79. 
21 /d. at 224, 479 N.E.2d at 178. 
22Jd. 
23 /d. at 216-17, 479 N.E.2d at 174. 
24 /d. at 216, 479 N.E.2d at 174. 
2s /d. at 218, 479 N.E.2d at 175. 
26 Id. The minority shareholders had acquired their interests in Hycor in 1969 when the 
company conducted a public offering of its stock in order to raise capital. /d. at 216-17, 
479 N.E.2d at 174. Hycor offered 75,000 shares of common stock at four dollars per share. 
/d. at 216-17, 479 N.E.2d at 174. None of the 331 minority shareholders purchased more 
than 4000 shares of Hycor stock. /d. at 218, 479 N.E.2d at 175. Immediately following the 
public offering, the defendant shareholders owned 440,000 shares which equaled 85% of 
the outstanding Hycor stock. /d. at 217, 479 N.E.2d at 174. The shares owned by the 
defendants were not registered under the Securities Act of 1933 and, therefore, sale of this 
stock was prohibited and a notation to that effect appeared on the stock certificates. /d. 
The Superior Court granted the plaintiff's motion under Massachusetts Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23 to have the suit certified as a class action as to the plaintiffs' claims of breach 
of fiduciary duty and fraud. /d. at 218-19, 479 N.E.2d at 175. The Superior Court Judge 
noted, however, that only those shareholders who had not voted in favor of the recapital-
ization plan would be proper plaintiffs in the action. /d. at 219, 479 N.E.2d at 175. 
21 ld. at 217, 479 N.E.2d at 174. 
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included a letter from defendant Hyram, as president of the company, 
stating the reasons for the proposal.28 According to Hyram's letter, the 
board of directors wanted to recapitalize the company because of "the 
somewhat disappointing market history of the stock" and because, in the 
Board's view, past dividends did not represent a significant return on the 
shareholders' investment. 29 
Under the proposed plan, shareholders would amend the articles of 
organization to reduce the authorized common stock from two million 
shares with a par value of one cent to five hundred shares with a par 
value of forty dollars. 30 Also, under the plan, Hycor would not issue 
fractional shares. 31 Instead, the company would pay five dollars for each 
"old" share of stock. 32 At the February shareholders' meeting the mi-
nority shareholders voted against both the reverse stock split and the 
offer to redeem fractional shares. 33 The majority voted in favor of the 
plan, however, and the plan passed.34 
The recapitalization plan forced the minority shareholders, who held 
only fractional shares after the amendment to Hycor's articles of orga-
nization, to redeem all of their shares. 35 The Hycor recapitalization plan 
thus eliminated all minority shareholders. 36 The minority shareholders as 
a class brought suit against Hycor and five of the majority shareholders 
who also held seats on Hycor's boardY The plaintiff class sought dam-
ages or, alternatively, for the court to declare the vote of the shareholders 
a nullity and to set the vote aside. 38 The trial court judge found in favor 
of the defendants. 39 The judge concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to 
demonstrate that there was no legitimate business purpose for the recap-
italization plan. 40 The judge also found that the five dollar redemption 
price was fair and reasonable. 41 The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme 
Judicial Court, contending that the trial court judge's conclusions were 
erroneous. 42 
28Jd. at 217-18, 479 N.E.2d at 174-75. 
29 ld. at 217, 479 N.E.2d at 175. 
30 ld. at 217, 479 N.E.2d at 174-75. 
31 ld. at 217, 479 N.E.2d at 175. 
32 ld. 
33 ld. 
34 ld. at 218, 479 N.E.2d at 175. 
35 See id. at 217, 479 N.E.2d at 174-75. 
36Jd. 
37 ld. at 218-19, 479 N.E.2d at 175. 
38 Jd. at 218, 479 N.E.2d at 175. 
39 ld. at 219, 479 N.E.2d at 175. 
40 ld. 
41 ld. at 219, 479 N.E.2d at 176. 
42 ld. at 216, 479 N.E.2d. at 174. 
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In upholding the Hycor plan, the Supreme Judicial Court first examined 
the statutory basis for the recapitalization plan and concluded that, on 
its face, the plan complied with the relevant sections of the Massachusetts 
Corporations Law. 43 According to the Supreme Judicial Court, the pro-
visions of the Corporations Law are designed to give majority sharehold-
ers more flexibility and "to remove what was in effect a power of veto 
held by a dissenting minority. "44 The Court determined that the plan was 
an appropriate use of the provisions of the statute to return the company 
to private status.45 
Having determined that transactions which "squeeze out" minority 
shareholders are not per se invalid, the Court next focused on the duty 
that the majority shareholders owe to minority shareholders in squeeze-
out transactions. 46 The Court noted that the lower court had applied the 
standard established in Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng-
land 47 of "utmost good faith and loyalty."48 Upholding the lower court's 
standard, the Supreme Judicial Court reiterated the Donahue holding that 
shareholders in a close corporation owe one another a duty of utmost 
43 ld. at 219, 479 N.E.2d at 176. Chapter 156B, section 28 provides in relevant part: 
Except as otherwise provided in the articles of organization or by-laws, a corpo-
ration may issue fractional shares of stock, and may issue in lieu thereof script in 
registered or bearer form which, depending on how the shares of the corporation 
are evidenced, shall entitle the holder to receive a certificate for a full share or have 
an uncertified share registered in his name upon the surrender of such script aggre-
gating a full share . . . . The directors shall fix the terms and conditions and manner 
of issue of such script, which may include ... a condition that the shares for which 
the script is exchangeable may be sold by the corporation and the proceeds thereof 
distributed to the holders of such script. 
G.L. c. 156B, § 28 (1984). 
Chapter 156B, section 71 provides in relevant part: 
A corporation may, ... authorize, at a meeting duly called for the purpose, by 
vote of two-thirds of each class of stock outstanding and entitled to vote thereon or, 
if the articles of organization so provide, by vote of a lesser proportion but not less 
than a majority of each class of stock outstanding and entitled to vote thereon, any 
amendment of its articles of organization; provided, only, that any provision added 
to or changes made in its articles of organization by such amendment could have 
been included in, and any provision deleted thereby could have been omitted from, 
original articles of organization filed at the time of such meeting. 
G.L. c. 156B, § 71 (1984). 
44 Leader, 395 Mass. at 221, 479 N.E.2d at 177 (citing Teschner, 59 Ill. 2d at 456, 322 
N.E.2d at 56). The Leader Court relied on the reasoning in Teschner, in which the Illinois 
Supreme Court upheld a similar plan to eliminate the minority shareholders of an Illinois 
company. Id . 
., ld. 
""'ld. 
47 367 Mass. 587, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975). 
48 Leader, 395 Mass. at 222, 479 N.E.2d at 177. 
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good faith and loyalty.49 In Leader, the Court also reaffirmed the prin-
ciples of Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc. 50 in the Leader Court's 
discussion of the majority shareholders' fiduciary duties.51 The Leader 
Court noted that Wilkes stands for the proposition that the Donahue 
strict good faith standard is satisfied by a demonstration of a legitimate 
business purpose for the majority shareholders' actions. 52 Furthermore, 
the Court noted, once the majority shareholders advance a valid business 
purpose, the minority shareholders bear the burden of proving that the 
majority's goal could have been achieved in a manner less harmful to the 
minority. 53 
_The Court then considered whether in the case before it, the majority 
shareholders had breached the duty of utmost good faith and loyalty in 
adopting the recapitalization plan. 54 The Court focused on the testimony 
of Hycor's president that the majority shareholders decided to go private 
because the company did not benefit by its public status because of the 
lack of a ready market for Hycor stock.55 In addition, the Court also 
considered and accepted the lower court's finding that the plaintiffs had 
failed to demonstrate that the company could have terminated compliance 
with the statutory duties of a public company or improved the marketa-
bility of the company's stock using a method other than a reverse stock 
split. 56 Consequently, the Court concluded that the defendants had met 
their burden of demonstrating a legitimate business purpose for adopting 
49 Id. The Donahue Court defined a close corporation as having "(!) a small number of 
stockholders; (2) no ready market for the corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority 
participation in the management, direction and operations of the corporation." Donahue, 
367 Mass. at 586, 328 N.E.2d at 511. Because the operation of a closely held company is 
similar to the operation of a partnership, the Donahue Court reasoned, the same fiduciary 
standard should apply. Id. at 592-93, 328 N.E.2d at 515. 
The Supreme Judicial Court narrowed the Donahue holding in Wilkes v. Springside 
Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976). In Wilkes, the Court held that 
when a minority shareholder brings an action for breach of fiduciary duty, the majority can 
demonstrate good faith by advancing a business purpose for its actions. Id. at 851, 353 
N.E.2d at 663. Thus, once the majority advances a business purpose for its actions, the 
burden of proof shifts to the minority to demonstrate that the legitimate objective could 
have been achieved in a manner less harmful to the minority's interests. Id. at 851-52, 353 
N.E.2d at 663. 
50 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976). 
51 395 Mass. at 222, 479 N.E.2d at 177. 
52 ld. (citing Wilkes, 370 Mass. at 851, 353 N.E.2d at 663). 
53 Leader, 395 Mass. at 221, 479 N.E.2d at 177 (citing Wilkes, 370 Mass. at 851, 353 
N.E.2d at 663). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 222-23, 479 N.E.2d at 177-78. 
56 Id. at 223, 479 N.E.2d at 178. 
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the recapitalization plan and thus had established that they acted in 
accordance with the Donahue standard of utmost good faith and loyalty. 57 
Finally, the Supreme Judicial Court considered the fairness of the five 
dollar redemption offer. 58 The Court stated that it would not overrule the 
judgment of the lower court unless the judgment was "clearly erro-
neous."59 The Court concluded, however, that the record did not suffi-
ciently detail the reasons for the trial court judge's decision as required 
by Massachusetts Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).60 The Court, therefore, 
remanded the case solely on the issue of the fairness of price so that the 
trial judge could detail his findings that the redemption price was fair and 
reasonable. 61 
The Supreme Judicial Court stated that it continued to approve of the 
"Delaware block method" for valuing the stock of closely held compa-
nies.62 That method employs a weighted average of the market value, 
earnings value, and net asset value to determine the fair value of the 
shares.63 In Weinberger v. U.O.P. Inc.,64 the Delaware Supreme Court 
determined that that valuation method was "outmoded" and should no 
longer "exclusively'' control appraisal or other stock appraisal cases.65 
The Weinberger Court abandoned the Delaware block method "to the 
extent that it excludes other generally accepted techniques used in the 
financial community ... to value stock. "66 
According to the Leader Court, however, the Delaware Supreme 
Court's decision in Weinberger was not inconsistent with the approach 
taken by the Supreme Judicial Court in Piemonte v. New Boston Garden 
Corp.,61 reasoning that in Piemonte, the Court suggested the Delaware 
method as one possible approach to valuation. 68 The Leader Court 
57 !d. at 222-23, 479 N.E.2d at 177-78. The Court, therefore, explicitly stated that it need 
not decide whether the majority shareholders' actions would have been upheld if they acted 
with only good faith and inherent fairness, the standard applied to non-closely held com-
panies. /d. at 223, 479 N.E.2d at 178. 
58 !d. at 223-24, 479 N.E.2d at 178-79. 
59 /d. at 223-24, 479 N.E.2d at 178. 
60 !d. at 224, 479 N.E.2d at 178. According to the Leader Court, in all actions tried 
without a jury, Rule 52(a) requires that the trial court find facts specially and separately 
state the court's conclusions of law. /d. 
61 /d. at 224, 479 N.E.2d at 179. 
62 !d. at 224, 479 N.E.2d at 178. 
63 Piemonte v. New Boston Garden Corp., 377 Mass. 719, 724, 387 N.E.2d 1145, 1148 
(1979). 
64 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
65 /d. 
66 /d. at 712-13. 
67 377 Mass. 719, 387 N.E.2d 1145 (1979). 
68 Leader, 395 Mass. at 224, 479 N.E.2d at 178. 
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pointed out, however, that the trial court judge need not follow only the 
Delaware block method to determine whether the offered price was fair. 69 
The Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Leader v. Hycor is significant 
in three respects. First, the decision supports the use of a reverse stock 
split together with the mandatory repurchase of fractional shares to elim-
inate minority shareholders. Second, the Leader decision further narrows 
the strict Donahue fiduciary standard for closely held corporations. 
Lastly, the decision clearly indicates that the Court will continue to 
accept the use of the Delaware block method for determining the value 
of closely held stock. 
Generally, majority shareholders can terminate the interests of minority 
shareholders70 and courts have consistently allowed public companies to 
return to private status.71 In assessing these transactions, however, sev-
eral state courts have required that majority shareholders act in accor-
dance with the fiduciary duty that the majority shareholders owe to the 
minority shareholders. 72 Consistent with tbese decisions, the Leader 
Court concluded that the defendants' actions were not a misuse of the 
relevant statutory provisions unless the defendants had breached the 
fiduciary duty they owed to the minority shareholders. Thus, the use of 
a reverse stock split to eliminate minority shareholders is acceptable if 
the majority shareholders have not breached their fiduciary duty to the 
minority shareholders. 
The Leader Court's application of the strict fiduciary duty outlined by 
the Court in Donahue is also noteworthy. In holding that the elimination 
of public ownership when there is no ready market for the stock is a 
legitimate business purpose, Leader continues the trend of narrowing the 
Donahue standard of utmost good faith and loyalty owed by the majority 
shareholders to the minority shareholders. The Donahue standard was 
first narrowed by the Court in Wilkes when the Court held that the 
majority shareholders could demonstrate good faith, and thus fulfill the 
Donahue standard, by advancing a business purpose for its actions. 73 
The Leader Court reaffirmed the principles of Wilkes and established 
that eliminating public ownership in order to eliminate the associated 
statutory duties when there is no ready market for the stock is a legitimate 
business purpose. 74 
69 /d. at 224, 479 N.E.2d at 179. 
70 Teschner, 59 Ill. 2d at 456, 322 N .E.2d at 56. See generally H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, 
LAW OF CORPORATIONS§ 240 (3d ed. 1983). 
71 See F.H. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 3, at§ 3:03. 
72 E.g., Clark, 87 Misc. 2d at 390, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 664-65. See M. LIPTON & E. 
STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOUTS § 9.01 (1986). 
73 See supra note 49. 
74 Leader, 395 Mass. at 223, 479 N.E.2d at 178. 
9
Martin et al.: Chapter 2: Corporations
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1985
44 1985 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW § 2.1 
Arguably, the Leader Court should not have applied the strict fiduciary 
duty established in Donahue to the facts at issue in the Leader case. The 
Court should have applied the lower standard of good faith and inherent 
fairness which applies to majority shareholders of publicly held compa-
nies.75 The lower court's application of the Donahue standard was clearly 
erroneous. Under the first prong of the Donahue test the corporation 
must have a small number of shareholders to qualify as a close corpo-
ration and thus to hold the majority shareholders to the more strict 
fiduciary duty. 76 Before the recapitalization plan, however, Hycor had 
over 300 shareholders77 and thus, arguably was not a close corporation. 
By accepting the lower court's application of the Donahue standard, 
the Leader Court has suggested that the Court will uphold this type of 
"going private" transaction regardless of the nature of the corporation 
involved. Also, by accepting the lower court's application of the Donahue 
standard the Court unnecessarily has restricted its ability to strike down 
the use of a reverse stock split to eliminate minority shareholders in the 
future. The Court should have made clear that Hycor was not a closely 
held corporation, and therefore was not subject to the Donahue standard. 
Instead, the Court's decision may result in the anomalous situation 
whereby the use of a reverse stock split to eliminate minority sharehold-
ers will not violate the lower standard of good faith and inherent fairness, 
but may violate the strict utmost good faith and loyalty standard estab-
lished in Donahue. 
The Leader Court's decision clearly indicates that the Supreme Judicial 
Court will continue to accept the Delaware block method to value stock. 
However, the Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Leader is not entirely 
consistent with the Weinberger decision. The Delaware Court suggested 
that the trial court's sole use of the Delaware block method where the 
plaintiff offers evidence using different valuation methods would be un-
acceptable.78 The Leader Court, on the other hand, suggested that while 
other methods could be used, a lower court might continue to apply the 
Delaware block method exclusively to value closely held stock. 79 Al-
»Donahue, 367 Mass. at 586, 328 N.E.2d at 511. 
76 Note, Contractual Disclaimer of the Donahue Fiduciary Duty: The Efficacy of the 
Anti-Donahue Clause, 26 B.C.L. REv. 215, 215-16 & n.7. 
n Leader, 395 Mass. at 218, 479 N.E.2d at 175. 
78 Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712-13. 
79 Leader, 395 Mass. at 224, 479 N.E.2d at 179. The Leader decision is consistent with 
the Weinberger decision in that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had never 
suggested that the Delaware block method was the only acceptable valuation method. See 
Piemonte, 377 Mass. at 723-24, 387 N.E.2d at 1148 (a judge "might appropriately follow" 
the Delaware block method for valuing closely held stock). Thus, while not required, the 
Court indicated that it would allow the use of more modem valuation methods for deter-
mining the value of closely held stock. See Leader, 395 Mass. at 224, 479 N.E.2d at 179. 
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though this distinction may appear slight, the ability to rely exclusively 
on the Delaware block method makes the determination of the stock's 
value significantly less difficult. 
In summary, in Leader v. Hycor, Inc., the Supreme Judicial Court 
upheld the use of a reverse stock split in conjunction with a mandatory 
repurchase of fractional shares to return a public company to private 
status. In doing so, the Court indicated that the Legislature intended to 
provide flexibility in corporate decision making. The Court stated, how-
ever, that majority shareholders must act consistently with their duty of 
loyalty and good faith to the minority shareholders. The majority satisfies 
this duty if it can prove a valid business purpose for its actions. Under 
Leader, the return of the corporation to private status, thus eliminating 
the SEC reporting requirements, is a valid business purpose. Finally, the 
Court indicated that it would continue to support the use of the Delaware 
block method in determining the fair value for the minority shareholders' 
stock. 
§ 2.2. Short Form Mergers - Fiduciary Duty of the Majority to Dis-
senting Minority Shareholders.* Chapter 156B, section 82 of the General 
Laws establishes independent procedures for merger of subsidiary cor-
porations into parent corporations. 1 Section 82 is a so-called short-form 
merger statute, which allows a parent corporation to merge into itself a 
largely owned subsidiary corporation through an expedited procedure. 2 
The majority of states have enacted similar short-form merger statutes, 
most of which are substantively and procedurally identical to the Mas-
sachusetts law. 3 
In order to avail itself of the Massachusetts short-form merger statute, 
the parent or acquiring corporation must own at least ninety percent of 
the stock of the subsidiary corporation to be acquired.4 If the ownership 
requirement is met, a merger can be effected merely by a vote of the 
directors of the parent adopting the plan of merger and assuming the 
subsidiary's obligations.5 Thus, approval for a section 82 merger is ob-
*David M. Rievman, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 2.2. 1 Horizon House-Microwave, Inc. v. Bazzy, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 190, 197, 486 
N.E.2d 70, 75 (1985); Joseph v. Wallace-Murray Corp., 354 Mass. 477, 480, 238 N.E.2d 
360, 362 (1968); Dickson v. Riverside Iron Works, Inc., 6 Mass. App. Ct. 53, 56-57, 372 
N.E.2d 1302, 1305 (1978). 
2 Bazzy, 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 196-97, 486 N.E.2d at 75. 
3 See, e.g., ABA-ALI MoDEL Bus. CoRP. AcT§ 75; CAL. CoRP. CODE§ 1110; CoNN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-370 (West 1960); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (1974); N.J. STAT. 
ANN.§ 14A:I0-5 (West 1969); WEST's McKINNEY's FORMS, BCL § 9:05 (1985); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 33-17-50 (Law Co-op. 1987). 
4 G.L. c. 156B, § 82(a). 
5 G.L. c. 156B, § 82(b). 
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tained far more easily than approval for a merger which must proceed 
under the general statute regulating corporate consolidations, chapter 
156B, section 78. Approval of a merger proposal under section 78 requires 
notice to the shareholders of the interested corporations,6 meetings of 
the shareholders of the corporations,? and the vote of the majority of 
each class of stock of each constituent corporation outstanding and en-
titled to vote on the question. 8 
In a short-form merger proceeding under section 82, where the parent 
corporation owns at least ninety percent of the stock of the corporation 
to be merged, the only right of a non-assenting minority shareholder, in 
the absence of illegality or fraud as to him, is his right to a determination 
of the value of his stock.9 Where close corporations are involved in a 
section 82 merger, the legality of the deal is subject to the additional 
requirement that majority shareholders comply with their strict fiduciary 
duty to deal fairly with minority shareholders. 10 This general duty of 
loyalty and fairness owed by majority participants in a close corporation 
to minority shareholders derives from the Supreme Judicial Court's pro-
nouncement in Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. 11 As set forth in Don-
ahue, majority shareholders in a close corporation may not act out of 
avarice or self-interest, in derogation of their duty of loyalty to other 
shareholders in the corporation, or to deprive minority shareholders of 
the fair market value of their investments. 12 Thus, the validity of a short 
form merger transaction between close corporations may come under 
scrutiny in two distinct analyses. First, the merger must be in technical 
compliance with section 82. Second, the merger must meet the tests of 
fairness and fiduciary dealing with respect to minority shareholders es-
tablished in Donahue. 
During the Survey year, in Horizon House-Microwave, Inc. v. Bazzy, 13 
the Massachusetts Appeals Court held that where the conditions for 
section 82 are met, its procedures govern the merger between two close 
corporations rather than the more onerous technical procedures of sec-
tion 78. 14 In addition, the court held that absent unfair tyrannization of 
the minority, or a breach of fiduciary duty by the majority to the dis-
senting minority shareholders in the subsidiary, the exclusive remedy for 
6 G.L. c. 156B, § 78(c)(i). 
7 G.L. c. 156B, § 78(c)(ii). 
• G.L. c. 156B, § 78(c)(iii). 
9 Joseph, 354 Mass. at 480, 238 N.E.2d at 362. 
10 See Bazzy, 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 198-99, 486 N.E.2d at 76; Donahue v. Rodd Electro-
type Co., 367 Mass. 578, 593, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (1975). 
11 Donahue, 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505. 
12 /d. at 593, 328 N.E.2d at 515. 
13 21 Mass. App. Ct. 190, 486 N.E.2d 70. 
14 /d. at 196-98, 486 N.E.2d at 75. 
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the dissenting shareholder is a demand for appraisal and payment on his 
shares. 15 
In Bazzy, the Appeals Court decided the claims of Emil Bazzy against 
his brother, William Bazzy, and the close corporations in which the two 
brothers were interested. The brothers' legal disputes resulted from their 
interests in a corporation, Horizon House, Inc. (Horizon), organized by 
them in 1958 to pursue a magazine publishing venture. 16 Horizon issued 
420 shares of voting common stock to William and 410 shares to Emil. 17 
Horizon's immediate purpose was to publish a trade magazine about 
microwave technology, and the corporation agreed with Theodore S. 
Saad, a specialist in that field, that if the venture proved successful, the 
magazine would be placed in a separate corporation in which Saad would 
receive stock. 18 The magazine did in fact prove successful, and in 1962 
the Bazzy brothers organized Horizon House-Microwave, Inc. (Micro-
wave), and issued 3000 shares of Microwave stock to William, 1000 
shares to Emil, and 1000 shares to Saad. 19 After the organization of 
Microwave, Horizon's functions were reduced to providing bookkeeping, 
administrative, and landlord services to Microwave. 20 
By 1974, Emil and William were entangled in multiple lawsuits. 21 In 
addition, Saad was agitating for the termination of the services rendered 
by Horizon to Microwave, since that arrangement drained cash from 
Microwave, in which Saad had an interest, to Horizon, in which he did 
not. 22 In June, 1974, the disparate parties struck a deal to assuage the 
grievances of Saad and the Bazzy brothers. 23 Microwave was to buy 
Emil's shares in Horizon for book value plus $10,000.24 William's shares 
in Horizon were then to be acquired by Microwave for book value, 
without a premium, in exchange, solely, for shares of Microwave. 25 As 
the result of this proposal, Microwave would own Horizon as a wholly 
owned subsidiary, thus putting to rest Saad's concern about cash flowing 
15 Id. at 200, 486 N.E.2d at 77. 
16 Id. at 191-92, 486 N.E.2d at 72. 
17 Id. at 192, 486 N.E.2d at 72. 
18 Jd. 
19 ld. 
20 Jd. Microwave, and two other operating companies organized by Saad and the Bazzy 
brothers, paid rent and fees to Horizon for its provision of these services. !d. at 192 & n.3, 
486 N.E.2d at 72 & n.3. 
21 Id. at 192, 486 N.E.2d at 72. The court did not specify the nature of the earlier legal 
disputes or identify the claims at issue in the prior lawsuits. In any event, the precise nature 
of the prior claims was not relevant to this action. 
22 Jd. 
23 Id. 
24 /d. Twenty-eight percent of the amount due Emil was to be paid in cash, with seventy-
two percent payable in the form of a note payable by Dedham. 
25 Jd. at 192-93, 486 N.E. 2d at 72-73. 
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away from Microwave. 26 When the time came to close the deal in No-
vember of 1974, however, Emil refused to execute itY As the statutory 
scheme then stood, a two-thirds vote of each class of stock of each 
constituent corporation was necessary to approve a merger agreement 
between Microwave and Horizon.28 Since William owned only a simple 
majority in Horizon, he could not effect the merger agreement without 
Emil's support. 29 
In 1976, however, a way out of the stockholders' deadlock developed 
when the Legislature amended chapter 156B, section 78(c)(l)(iii) to per-
mit authorization of merger agreements by vote of a majority, rather than 
two-thirds, of each class of stock entitled to vote on the question. 30 A 
decisive vote was now possible for Horizon, and as far as the record 
disclosed, for Microwave as well.3' Since Saad's grievance about money 
flowing from Microwave to Horizon continued to grow, to the point where 
he threatened to initiate a stockholder's derivative suit against Micro-
wave, Microwave continued to have a good business reason to close 
down Horizon's operations.J2 
In June of 1977, Microwave adopted a triangular merger as a means to 
that end.33 First, it effected the formation of a wholly-owned subsidiary, 
Horizon House-Dedham, Inc. (Dedham).34 Second, Dedham, by vote of 
its sole stockholder (Microwave), and Horizon, by a vote of a majority 
of shares issued and outstanding, entered into a merger agreement pur-
suant to which Horizon would be merged into Dedham. 35 The surviving 
corporation, Dedham, would exchange $29,901.26 in cash, and $76,888.97 
in a note of Dedham for Emil's stock in Horizon.36 For William's Horizon 
stock, Dedham would exchange 5,475 shares of voting common stock of 
Microwave. 37 Third, Dedham would change its name to Horizon House, 
26 Id. at 193, 486 N.E.2d at 73. 
27 ld. 
28 Id. 
29 ld. See G.L. c. 156B, § 78(c)(l)(iii) as appearing in St. 1969, c. 392, § 19. 
30 ld. See St. 1976, c. 327. In 1981, however, the legislature raised the vote required to 
approve a merger back to a two-thirds majority, unless a lesser proportion, but not Jess 
than a majority, is provided for in the articles of organization. See St. 1981, c. 298 § 4. Id. 
31 Id. at 193, 486 N.E.2d at 73. 
32 Id. at 194, 486 N.E.2d at 73-74. 
33 Id. at 194, 486 N.E.2d at 74. 
34 ld. 
"ld. at 194-95, 486 N.E.2d at 74. 
36 Id. at 195, 486 N.E.2d at 74. The note was payable in five equal annual installments 
with a floating rate of interest on the unpaid balance of two percent above the prime rate. 
I d. 
37 ld. Microwave had earlier prepared for this exchange by issuing 5475 shares of its 
stock to Dedham. Id. at n.9. 
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Inc. 38 Articles of merger to this effect were filed June 27, 1977.39 A fourth 
step, outside the merger agreement between Horizon and Dedham, oc-
curred on November 25, 1977, when the directors of Microwave, acting 
under chapter 156B, section 82 of the General Laws, voted to merge into 
Microwave this new wholly-owned subsidiary which had acquired the 
stock of Horizon.40 Thus, only Microwave survived.41 
While this lawsuit was technically initiated by Microwave against Emil 
Bazzy, at issue in the appellate proceedings were Emil's counterclaims 
directed at William Bazzy, Horizon, and Microwave.42 Basically, Emil's 
grievance was that he was "cashed-out" of Horizon, while his brother 
William wound up with a larger equity interest in the surviving corpo-
ration, Microwave.43 Thus, Emil's complaint was with the end result of 
the triangular merger, and his counterclaim attacked both the technical 
legality of the merger, and charged that William, Microwave, and Horizon 
breached the common law fiduciary duties they owed to him, as a mi-
nority stockholder in a close corporation.« As Emil's counsel conceded 
on closing argument, Emil did not wish to unravel the merger, but to be 
given parity with William in what was exchanged for his Horizon stock, 
that is, shares of Microwave rather than cash. 45 
Emil directed all of his allegations of deviation from statutory require-
ments at Microwave. 46 First, he asserted that in violation of chapter 
156B, section 78(c)(l)(ii), Microwave failed to give each stockholder of 
record thirty days notice of a meeting to approve the merger agreement. 47 
Second, Emil alleged that in violation of section 78(c)(l)(iii), the merger 
agreement between Horizon and Dedham was not approved by the stock-
holders of Microwave.48 Finally, Emil alleged that in violation of section 
78(c)(2)(ii), the merger agreement was not approved by the stockholders 
of Microwave. 49 
The court found these allegations wholly without merit, holding that 
since Microwave was never a party to a section 78 merger agreement, 
38 Id. at 195, 486 N.E.2d at 74. 
39 Jd. 
40 Jd. Under G.L. c. 156B, § 82(a), a corporation owning at least ninety percent of the 
outstanding shares of each class of stock of another corporation, may merge into itself that 
corporation merely by a vote of its directors. G.L. c. 156B § 82(a). 
41 Bazzy, 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 195, 486 N.E.2d at 74. 
42 ld. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 195-200, 486 N.E.2d at 74-77. 
45 Jd. at 196, 486 N.E.2d at 74. 
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none of the procedures or requirements of section 78(c) applied to Mi· 
crowave. 50 The only parties to the section 78 merger agreement of which 
Emil complained, the court held, were Horizon and Dedham. 51 Since the 
merger of Horizon and Dedham proceeded pursuant to a majority vote 
of the stockholders of each corporation, 52 as was then required by stat-
ute, 53 the court found the technical legality of that merger certain. The 
court held that neither the issuance of 5475 shares of stock by Microwave 
to Dedham, nor Microwave's ultimate absorbtion of Horizon involved 
section 78.54 The latter merger, the court recognized, proceeded under 
section 82, a statute which provides independent procedures for the 
merger of subsidiary corporations into parent corporations. 55 The court 
noted that a section 82 merger does not require approval of stockholders, 
and that any attempt to read the requirements of subsection (c) of section 
78 into section 82 is clearly erroneous.56 Elimination of minority share-
holder interests without a stockholder vote, the court added, is an ac-
knowledged objective of short-form merger statutes such as section 82.57 
The Appeals Court then turned to a consideration of the policy aspects 
underlying the triangular merger device. The court conceded that the 
triangular merger clearly permits an acquiring corporation to outflank the 
requirement of stockholder approval which attends a straight merger 
under section 78.58 The court, however, balanced this potential negative 
against the great business and income tax benefits of the triangle tech-
nique, 59 and held that unless technical adherence to corporate form is 
used to inflict gross inequity, injury or fraud, compliance with corporate 
form will be recognized and tolerated. 60 Short of a showing of fraud, 
gross inequity, or injury, the court held, it would not encumber proce-
so Id. 
5lfd. 
52 /d. at 194, 486 N.E.2d at 74. 
53 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
54 Bazzy, 2i Mass. App. Ct. at 197, 486 N.E.2d at 75. 
55 /d. See Joseph 354 Mass. at 480, 238 N.E.2d at 362. 
56 Bazzy, 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 197, 486 N.E.2d at 75. 
51 /d. See also Burgman and Cox, Reappraising the Role of the Shareholder in the Modern 
Public Corporation: Weinberger's Procedural Approach to Fairness in Freezeouts, 1984 
WIS. L. REv. 597, 600 (1984). 
58 Bazzy, 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 197, 486 N.E.2d at 75. 
59 /d. The court counted among the benefits of the triangle merger technique relief from 
expensive proxy solicitations, insulation from business risks taken by the acquired corpo-
ration, and the ability to achieve a tax-free reorganization under federal income tax Jaw. 
/d. 
60 /d. See My Bread Baking Co. v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 353 Mass. 614, 618 & n.6, 
619-20, 233 N.E.2d 748, 751 (1968); M. McDonough Corp. v. Connelly, 313 Mass. 62, 65-
66, 46 N.E.2d 576, 579 (1943). 
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dures which the statute expressly authorizes to provide desired fl.exibil-
ity.6I 
Next, the court addressed Emil's claims of breach of fiduciary duty of 
the majority to a minority shareholder in a close corporation. Citing 
Donahue, 62 the court stated that the mere facts that a corporate action 
is permitted by the statutory scheme and that the majority has the votes 
to approve the action, are not alone sufficient to secure judicial approval 
of the action. 63 Rather, a corporation's transactions are subject to the 
additional condition, particularly in a close corporation, that majority 
stockholders "may not act out of avarice, expediency, or self-interest in 
derogation of their duty of loyalty to the other stockholders arid to the 
corporation. "64 The majority shareholders, the court reiterated, may not 
unfairly tyrannize the minority. 65 
Analyzing Emil's complaints of oppression at the hands of the majority, 
the court opined that the oppression complained of was oppression of a 
very limited sort. 66 The court distinguished the Donahue case on the 
grounds that in that case the majority shareholders arranged the sale of 
their shares in a close corporation on favorable cash terms and left the 
minority holding shares for which there was a doubtful market. 67 The 
instant case, the court held, presented a nearly opposite situation. 68 In 
Bazzy, the majority gave the minority shareholder cash for his shares, 
based on an appropriate measure of the stock's book value. 69 In finding 
that Emil had not been unduly oppressed, the court reasoned, first, that 
the triangular merger of 1977 effectively carried out the economic objec-
tives of the 1974 arrangement, in which Emil had accepted almost iden-
tical terms for disposition of his Horizon stock. 70 Second, the court 
stated, on the record it appeared that Emil's cash settlement for his 
Horizon shares was as valuable share per share as William's settlement 
paid in shares of Microwave. 71 Thus, the court concluded, the cash and 
note paid to Emil reflected fairly the value of his holdings in Horizon. 72 
61 Bazzy, 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 198, 486 N.E.2d at 75. See Leader v. Hycor, Inc., 395 
Mass. 215, 221,479 N.E.2d 173, 177-78 (1985). 
62 Donahue, 367 Mass. at 593, 328 N.E.2d at 515. 
63 Bazzy, 21 Mass App. Ct. at 198, 486 N.E.2d at 76. 
64 /d. 
65 /d. Leader, 395 Mass. at 221-22,479 N.E.2d at 177; See Wilkes, 370 Mass. at 849, 353 
N.E.2d at 662. 
66 Bazzy, 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 198, 486 N .E.2d at 76. 
67 /d. at 199, 486 N .E.2d at 76. 
68 /d. 
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Furthermore, the court held that there were important business pur-
poses for giving Emil cash for his Horizon holdings rather than equity in 
Microwave. 73 Taking into account the past history of hostility and dead-
lock between the brothers, the court reasoned that if both Emil and 
William were to increase their stakes in Microwave, there would be a 
considerable liklihood that the brothers would continue to quibble and 
thwart each other in the future, to the detriment of the corporate enter-
prise. 74 The court thus concluded that Microwave and William had a 
legitimate business purpose for structuring the merger as they did, in 
order to allow Microwave to function effectively in the best interests of 
all concerned. 75 
Finally, the court held that Emil would have done better to avail himself 
of the appraisal remedies provided under chapter 156B, sections 86 
through 98 of the General Laws. 76 Indeed, the court explained, section 
98 provides that a demand for appraisal is the exclusive remedy for a 
stockholder who dissents from a merger, except that a stockholder may 
bring an appropriate proceeding to obtain relief on the ground that the 
corporate action was illegal or fraudulent as to him. 77 Such a demand for 
appraisal, the court noted, would have focused attention on the core of 
Emil's grievance, the inadequacy of the settlement he received in ex-
change for his interest in Horizon, without the added burden he assumed 
in this action of proving illegal or fraudulent conduct. 78 
In Bazzy, the Appeals Court analyzed the challenged triangular merger 
between Horizon, Microwave, and Dedham on two levels. First, the 
court scrutinized the transactions for technical compliance with section 
82, and differentiated the legal requirements applicable to mergers be-
tween parent and subsidiary corporations from those bearing upon merg-
ers between unrelated corporations. Second, the court examined whether 
the majority dealt fairly with minority shareholders in effecting the merger 
agreements, in the context of the duties devolving upon it under Dona-
hue. 
In Bazzy, the Appeals Court refused to read the strictures of chapter 
156B, section 78(c), the statute generally governing mergers, into section 
82, the short-form merger statute.79 In holding that section 82 provides 
independent procedures for merging subsidiary corporations into a par-
ent, and in refusing to encumber its operation with the more onerous 
73 /d. 
74 /d. at 199-200, 486 N.E.2d at 76-77. 
75 /d. at 200, 486 N.E.2d at 77. See also Leader, 395 Mass. at 222, 479 N.E.2d at 177. 
76 Bazzy, 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 200, 486 N.E.2d at 77. 
77 /d. 
78 /d. 
79 /d. at 196-97, 486 N.E.2d at 75. 
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technical requirements of section 78, the court upheld the integrity of the 
statute.80 It is well recognized in both Massachusetts and other jurisdic-
tions that short-merger statutes serve useful and expeditious purposes in 
corporate enterprise.81 Similarly, the courts are in general agreement that 
where a transaction complies with the technical parameters of a short-
form merger statute, the sole remedy of complaining minority sharehold-
ers is an appraisal and payment of the fair value of their shares. 82 Absent 
gross inequity or fraud as to a dissenting minority shareholder opposed 
to the merger of parent and subsidiary, the minority shareholder has no 
right other than to fair payment for his sharehold.83 Minority shareholders 
do not have a vested right to a continuation of their investment. 84 Unless 
corporate form is used to unfairly tyrannize a minority shareholder, the 
court held, it will be tolerated so long as it complies with statutory 
parameters. 85 
The court's holding that a minority shareholder has no remedy for 
breach of duty when he receives an adequate cash settlement for his 
investment, despite his preference to receive payment in the form of 
shares in the acquiring corporation, is consistent with the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court's pronouncements on the fiduciary duties of co-venturers in 
a close corporation. The rule of Donahue is simply that a majority share-
holder may not sell his or her own interest in a close corporation on 
advantageous terms if by doing so he or she traps the minority share-
holders into a situation in which they have no outlet to receive a fair 
value for their shares.86 Donahue does not expressly or impliedly create 
a right of a minority shareholder to a continuation of his or her invest-
ment.87 
The Appeals Court, then, in finding that William Bazzy and Microwave 
did not breach their fiduciary duties to Emil Bazzy in effecting a triangular 
80 /d. 
81 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
82 See id. at 197,486 N.E.2d at 75. See also Beloffv. Consolidated Edison Co., 300 N.Y. 
l1, 19-20, 87 N .E.2d 561, 564-65 (1949); Weinberger v. U .O.P., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. S. Ct. 
1983); David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30, 35 (Del. Ch. 1971); 
Wilcox v. Stern, 18 N.Y.2d 195, 201-02, 273 N.Y.S.2d 38, 43, 19 N.E.2d 401, 404 (1966). 
83 Bazzy, 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 198-99, 486 N.E.2d at 75-77; Coyne v. Park & Tilford 
Distillers Corp., 38 Del. Ch. 514, 521-22, 154 A.2d 893, 897-98 (1959); Bove v. Community 
Hotel Corp. of Newport, 105 R.I. 36, 55, 249 A.2d 89, 98 (1969). 
84 /d. 
85 Bazzy, 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 196-97, 486 N.E.2d at 75. 
86 /d. at 198-99, 486 N.E.2d at 76; Donahue, 367 Mass. at 593, 328 N.E.2d at 515. 
87 Indeed, it is the near reverse situation which characterized the shareholder's plight in 
Donahue. In that case, the Court held that the majority shareholders violated their fiduciary 
duty to the minority by "trapping" them into their investment, leaving the minority with 
no outlet to recoup the fair cash value of their shares. Donahue, 367 Mass. at 592-93, 328 
N.E.2d at 514-15. See also cases cited supra note 83. 
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merger, properly applied the law of close corporations in this Common-
wealth. Donahue merely requires that minority shareholders be given an 
opportunity to receive the fair cash value for their shares. It does not 
also guarantee the reverse; an indefinite and interminable right to contin-
uation of their investment. Thus, the court's holding in Bazzy, that where 
a minority shareholder is cashed-out of his shares in a merger transaction, 
and receives a fair cash value for those shares, he has no remedy for 
breach of duty, is consistent with the current state of the law on the 
fiduciary duties owed to participants in a close corporation. 88 The Mas-
sachusetts Appeals Court's holding in Bazzy, then, is consistent with the 
statutory schemes erected by the legislature to regulate corporate merg-
ers, and with the current state of the law in Massachusetts concerning 
the fiduciary obligations of co-venturers in close corporations. 
§ 2.3. Rescission of Mergers Effected in Violation of Chapter 156B, 
Sections 78(c)(l)(ii) and (iii).* Most jurisdictions generally agree that some 
statutory provisions governing corporate behavior are designed to protect 
shareholders of the corporation.' Examples of shareholder protection 
provisions include the requirement of shareholder approval for certain 
types of corporate transactions,2 and the anti-fraud provisions of the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 regulating proxy solicitation.3 Cor-
porate transactions undertaken without complying with such provisions, 
however, are not necessarily void. 4 Instead, courts have held that if a 
corporation fails to comply with the requirements of a shareholder pro-
88 See Donahue, 367 Mass. at 592-93, 328 N.E.2d at 514-15. Indeed, the Bazzy court 
noted, the exclusive remedy of a shareholder who dissents from a merger is a demand for 
appraisal, so as to ensure that the shareholder receives the fair value of his investment. 
Bazzy, 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 200, 486 N.E.2d at 77; G. L. c. l56B, § 98. 
*Dorothy P. Whelan, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 2.3. 1 Royal lndem. Co. v. American Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 165, 171 (1933); 
Greene v. Reconstr. Fin. Corp., 100 F.2d 34, 36 (lst Cir. 1938); Mid-Continent Tel. Corp. 
v. Home Tel. Co., 319 F. Supp. ll76, ll95 (N.D. Miss. 1970); George H. Gilbert Mfg. Co. 
v. Goldfine, 317 Mass. 681, 686-87, 59 N.E.2d 461, 464 (1945) (dictum). 
2 Royal, 289 U.S. at 170-71 (Maine statute forbidding transfer, except in usual course of 
business, of franchises or assets of corporation, without assent of stockholders); Greene, 
100 F.2d at 35, 36 (Delaware statute forbidding sale, lease, or exchange of all of corpora-
tion's property and assets without consent of majority of stockholders); Gilbert, 317 Mass. 
at 686-87, 59 N.E.2d at 464 (Massachusetts statute forbidding sale, lease, or exchange of 
all of corporation's property and assets without consent of two-thirds of stockholders). 
3 Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § l4(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1986). See Mills v. 
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 388 (1970). 
4 Mills, 396 U.S. at 386-88. See also Mid-Continent, 319 F. Supp. at ll95. For example, 
corporate transactions undertaken without complying with the requirements of shareholder 
protection provisions are valid as against creditors and other third parties, who have no 
standing to protest violations of statutory provisions not designed for their protection. 
Royal, 298 U.S. at 171; Greene, 100 F.2d at 36-37. 
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tection provision, an injured shareholder has the option of rescinding the 
transaction. 5 Courts will grant rescission if it is equitable to do so under 
the circumstances.6 
Chapter 156B, section 78(c)(l)(iii) of the Massachusetts General Laws 
provides that corporate mergers require the approval of two-thirds of the 
outstanding shares of each corporation participating in the merger. 7 Sec-
tion 78(c)(l)(ii) provides that notice of the meeting called for the purpose 
of voting on the merger proposal must be sent to the shareholders of 
each corporation participating in the merger. 8 Neither provision, how-
ever, specifies the consequences of a corporation's failure to comply with 
its requirements. 
During the Survey year, in Pitts v. Halifax Country Club, Inc.,9 the 
Massachusetts Appeals Court held that sections 78(c)(l)(ii) and (iii) were 
designed to protect the shareholders of the corporations involved in the 
merger. 10 Thus, the court held that a merger accomplished without com-
plying with the requirements of sections 78(c)(l)(ii) and (iii) is voidable 
at the request of an injured shareholder, unless the shareholder is es-
topped by his or her own conduct from rescinding the merger. 11 The ·court 
refused to rescind the merger in Pitts because the merger did not ad-
versely affect the shareholder's economic interests, and because the 
shareholder had previously entered into an oral agreement, although 
legally unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, to sell his shares to 
the corporation in order to allow the corporation to complete the merger. 
Pitts is significant because it demonstrates that failure to comply with 
sections 78(c)(l)(ii) and (iii) may not be fatal to a merger. Moreover, Pitts 
illustrates circumstances under which a court will refuse to rescind a 
'Mills, 396 U.S. at 387-88 (contracts made in violation of § 14(a) of Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 14a-9 are void as against violator, but are voidable at 
option of innocent party). 
6 /d. at 386. 
7 G.L. c. 1568, § 78(c)(l)(iii) states in pertinent part: 
[T]he vote of two-thirds of the shares of each class of stock of each constituent 
corporation outstanding and entitled to vote on the question, or, if the articles of 
organization so provide, the vote of a lesser proportion but not less than a majority 
of each class of stock of each constituent corporation outstanding and entitled to 
vote on the question, shall be necessary for the approval of such [merger] agreement. 
8 G.L. c. 1568, § 78(c)(l)(ii) states in pertinent part: 
Notice of the time, place and purpose of such meeting [at which the merger proposal 
is submitted] shall be given to each stockholder of record, whether or not entitled 
to vote thereat, of each such corporation [participating in the merger] ... at least 
thirty days prior to the date of such meeting. 
9 19 Mass. App. Ct. 525, 476 N.E.2d 222 (1985). 
10 Id. at 532, 476 N.E.2d at 227. 
II fd. 
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merger effected in violation of sections 78(c)(l)(ii) and (iii), despite a 
shareholder's objections. 
The defendant corporation in Pitts, the Halifax Country Club, was a 
golf course and club formed in 1965 by two colleagues, Henrich and 
Wyman, each of whom contributed land and $50,000 in return for forty-
nine of the corporation's 300 authorized capital shares Y In 1967, the 
corporation's authorized capital stock increased to 5300 shares, and the 
corporation bought back Wyman's shares.B Thereafter, Henrich ran the 
corporation as his own company. 14 
In 1968, Henrich attempted to raise capital for the corporation by 
attracting additional investors. 15 Henrich offered to sell each investor 
Halifax shares at $100 per share, with the promise that each investor 
could return his or her shares at any time for $100 per share plus six 
percent interest. 16 The plaintiff, Pitts, responded to the offer. 17 Pitts, a 
professional golf player with extensive experience operating golf courses, 
offered his services in return for Halifax stock. 18 
In March, 1968, Henrich (representing the corporation) and Pitts exe-
cuted a written agreement whereby Pitts would receive 100 shares of 
stock and a three year option to purchase up to 750 shares at $100 per 
share. 19 In return, Pitts would provide the club with his services as 
director of club operations and management consultant on a part-time 
basis for one year. 20 In May, 1968, Pitts purchased twenty shares for 
$2,000 and in November, 1968, Pitts received the 100 shares promised 
under his contract. 21 By the end of 1968, therefore, Pitts held 120 shares,22 
making him the majority shareholder in the corporation. Henrich, how-
ever, continued to run the corporation. 23 
The Halifax corporation lost money during its first two years of oper-
12 /d. at 527, 476 N.E.2d at 225. Another party, Sullivan, who had furnished legal services 
to the corporation and acted as the corporation's clerk, received two shares. /d. at 527-
28, 476 N.E.2d at 225. 
13 /d. at 528, 476 N.E.2d at 225. 
14 !d. At some point, Sullivan had. transferred one of his shares to the corporation and 
one to Henrich, id., leaving Henrich the sole shareholder. 




19 !d. The option was exercisable beginning on October I, 1968. /d. 
20 /d. 
21 /d. The court noted that it was unclear whether Pitts purchased the twenty shares 
pursuant to the option agreement. /d. 
22 /d. at 528-29, 476 N.E.2d at 225. Henrich held only fifty shares. !d. at 529, 476 N.E.2d 
at 225. Pitts, however, may have been unaware that he, and not Henrich, was the majority 
shareholder. /d. at 536 n.ll, 476 N.E.2d at 229 n.ll. 
23 /d. at 528-29, 476 N.E.2d at 225. 
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ation. 24 Consequently, in 1969 Henrich decided to merge Halifax with 
two financially secure corporations which he owned in order to raise 
additional capital for Halifax. 25 To effect the merger, Henrich offered 
each shareholder $100 per share plus six percent interest in return for 
selling the shares back to the corporation. 26 All of the shareholders except 
Pitts agreed to sellY Henrich then explained the merger plans to Pitts 
and began to negotiate, on behalf of Halifax, for Pitts' shares. 28 By 
February, 1969, Henrich and Pitts had reached an oral agreement 
whereby Pitts agreed inter alia to sell his shares to the corporation for 
$18,000 and to surrender his stock purchase option. 29 The only point 
which remained to be settled was the form in which Pitts was to receive 
the $18,000.30 
Relying on Pitts' oral promise to sell his shares, Henrich called a 
stockholders' meeting at which the merger was approved, with Henrich 
and the corporation's clerk in attcndance. 31 Notice of the meeting was 
never sent to Pitts, nor did Pitts participate in the vote on the merger 
proposal,32 in violation of what is now chapter 156B, sections 78(c)(l)(ii) 
and (iii), respectively. Subsequently, the oral agreement which Henrich 
and Pitts had reached collapsed, and in 1971 Pitts commenced an action 
in superior court to rescind the merger or to exercise appraisal rights. 33 
Pitts argued that the merger was void because the corporation failed 
to give him notice of the meeting at which the merger was approved and 
because two-thirds of the corporation's outstanding shares did not ap-
24 /d. at 529, 476 N .E.2d at 226. 
25 ld. 
16 /d. It is unclear why Henrich decided to repurchase all of the corporation's outstanding 
shares in order to effect the merger, rather than convening a shareholders' meeting for a 
vote on the merger. 
27 ld. One other shareholder, holding one share and not involved in the litigation, also 
did not accept Henrich's offer. ld. 
28Jd. 
29 /d. at 529-30, 476 N.E.2d at 226. Pitts also agreed to enter into a noncompetition 
agreement and long-term Halifax membership and consulting arrangement, and retained a 
right of first refusal in the event that a third party made an offer for the club and its grounds. 
/d. 
30 /d. at 530, 476 N .E.2d at 226. The $18,000 would either be attributed entirely to Pitts' 
120 shares or would be apportioned between the shares and the noncompetition agreement. 
ld. See supra note 29. 
31 Id. at 530, 476 N.E.2d at 226. Articles of merger were then filed with the Secretary of 
the Commonwealth. Id. 
32Jd. 
33 I d. at 525, 530, 476 N .E.2d at 224, 226. Under G.L. c. 1568, §§ 85-98, a minority 
shareholder who objects to a merger has the right to have his or her shares appraised, and 
to demand payment from the surviving corporation for the shares. It is unclear why Pitts, 
who was the majority shareholder, sought to exercise appraisal rights. It is possible that 
Pitts was unaware that he was the majority shareholder. See supra note 22. 
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prove the merger, in violation of sections 78(c)(l)(ii) and (iii), respec-
tively.~4 Pitts also asserted that the oral agreement for the sale of his 
shares should be disregarded because the Statute of Frauds, expressed 
in chapter 106, section 8-319 of the Massachusetts General Laws, bars 
enforcement of oral agreements for the sale of securities.35 Pitts con-
tended that he was entitled to have Halifax's assets segregated from the 
assets of the other merged corporations and to receive for his stock a 
percentage of Halifax's segregated assets equal to the percentage of 
Halifax stock he owned prior to the merger. 36 This amounted to 70.18% 
of Halifax's segregated assets, for a total of $711 ,453. 37 Additionally, Pitts 
sought compensation for the stock purchase option he had, representing 
an additional $241,984. 38 Pitts' total demands ~mounted to 94.46% of 
Halifax's segregated assets. 39 
Six years after commencing the initial action, Pitts filed a motion for 
summary judgment on the issue of the corporation's liability for violating 
sections 78(c)(l)(ii) and (i~i). 40 The superior court granted Pitts' motion 
and one year later appointed a master to make findings relating to the 
issue of remedy. 41 The master's report contained both general and sub-
sidiary findings. 42 Pitts objected to the subsidiary findings, but the supe-
rior court overruled his objections.43 Pitts then appealed.44 
The appeals court analyzed the remedy issue in three steps. First, the 
court considered Pitts' argument that the oral agreement for the sale of 
34 /d. at 530-31, 476 N.E.2d at 226-27. 
"/d. at 531-32, 476 N.E.2d at 227. G.L. c. 106, § 8-319 provides in pertinent part: 
A contract for the sale of securities is not enforceable by way of action or defense 
unless: (a) there is some writing signed by the party against whol)l enforcement is 
sought ... sufficient to indicate that a contract has been made for sale of a stated 
quantity of described securities at a defined or stated price . . . . 
36 19 Mass. App. Ct. at 531, 476 N.E.2d at 227. 
37 /d. 
38 /d. Pitts determined this figure by measuring the difference in value between the 70.18% 
of Halifax, worth $711,453, to which Pitts asserted he was entitled, and the portion of 
Halifax he would have owned (94.46%) if he had been able to exercise the option, and then 
subtracting the cost of exercising the option from the difference. !d. 
39 /d. 
40 See id. at 526 n.2, 476 N.E.2d at 224 n.2. 
41 /d. 
42 /d. at 526, 476 N.E.2d at 224. The Appeals Court did not describe the master's findings. 
43 /d. The superior court judge never explicitly adopted the master's report. /d. He 
disagreed with the master's general findings and submitted his own independent findings 
based on the reported evidence. /d. at 526 n.2, 476 N.E.2d at 224 n.2. The Appeals Court, 
however, treated the judge's action in overruling Pitts' objections to the master's subsidiary 
findings as an adoption of the master's report with the general findings excised. /d. at 526, 
476 N.E.2d at 224. The Appeals Court stated that the master's subsidiary findings provided 
an adequate basis for entering judgment. /d. at 527,476 N.E.2d at 224. 
44 See id. at 526-27 & n.2, 476 N.E.2d at 224 & n.2. 
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his shares was unenforceable under chapter 106, section 8-319. The court 
agreed with Pitts, noting that the specific language of section 8-319 bars 
the enforcement of oral agreements for the sale of securities. 45 Thus, the 
oral agreement was not legally binding on Pitts. 46 
The court next considered whether the corporation's failure to send 
Pitts notice and to obtain a two-thirds vote prior to effecting the merger, 
in violation of chapter 156B, sections 78(c)(l)(ii) and (iii), rendered the 
merger void. The court held that a corporation's failure to comply with 
the requirements of sections 78(c)(l)(ii) and (iii) does not void the merger, 
but instead makes it voidable at the request of a shareholder, unless the 
shareholder's conduct estops him or her from rescinding the mergerY In 
so holding, the court explained that the purpose of sections 78(c)(l)(ii) 
and (iii) is to protect the rights of shareholders. 48 The court noted that in 
general shareholders may elect to waive provisions designed for their 
protection, so that corporate actions effected without complying with the 
requirements of shareholder protection provisions will be enforceable 
unless the shareholders object. 49 Therefore, the court reasoned, because 
sections 78(c)(l)(ii) and (iii) are shareholder protection provisions, Hali-
fax's failure to observe their requirements rendered the Halifax merger 
voidable at Pitts' option. 50 
Finally, the court considered whether it would be inequitable to allow 
Pitts to rescind the Halifax merger. The court ruled that under the cir-
cumstances of this case rescission would be inequitable. 51 The court 
reasoned that because rescission was an equitable remedy, the court had 
to determine whether the merger had harmed Pitts and whether rescission 
would be unjust to Halifax and the shareholders of the corporations 
merged into Halifax. 52 Regarding whether Pitts was harmed, the court 
noted that the merger did not impair the value of Pitts' shares because 
the two corporations merged into Halifax received for their assets shares 
of Halifax on the same $100 per share basis for which Pitts had obtained 
his shares within one year of the merger. 53 Thus, both before and after 
the merger Pitts held 120 shares of Halifax stock worth a total of 




49 /d. at 532-33, 476 N.E.2d at 227-28. The court noted that this was particularly true 
where the rights of creditors and other third parties were not involved. See id. at 532-33, 
476 N.E.2d at 228. 
50 See id. at 532-33, 476 N .E.2d at 227-28. 
51 See id. at 536, 476 N .E.2d at 229. 
52 Jd. at 533-34, 476 N.E.2d at 228. 
53 /d. at 534-35, 476 N.E.2d at 229. 
25
Martin et al.: Chapter 2: Corporations
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1985
60 1985 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW § 2.3 
$12,000.54 On the other hand, the court found that awarding Pitts the 
70.18% of Halifax's segregated assets which he sought would substan-
tially drain Halifax of its assets, thus defeating the purpose of the 
merger,55 and would leave the shareholders of the two corporations 
merged into Halifax with nothing. 56 Therefore, the court refused to res-
cind the merger. 57 
In reaching its decision on the rescission issue, the court was partic-
ularly influenced by the fact that although Pitts complained he did not 
receive notice of the meeting at which the merger proposal was voted on 
and did not vote to approve it, Pitts had actual knowledge of the im-
pending merger because Henrich had told him about it. 58 In addition, the 
court observed that after learning of the merger plans, Pitts orally agreed 
to sell his shares to the corporation on terms giving him a substantial 
profit, knowing Henrich and the corporation would rely on the agreement 
in carrying out the merger. 59 The court reasoned that even though the 
oral agreement for the sale of Pitts' shares was legally unenforceable, it 
nevertheless would be inequitable to disregard its existence for the pur-
poses of determining whether to rescind the merger because to do so 
would give Pitts an undeserved windfall. 60 The court explained that its 
position was not inconsistent with the Statute of Frauds' prohibition on 
the oral sales of securities because the court was not enforcing the oral 
agreement. 61 The court, however, then ruled that because the corporation 
had relied on the oral agreement in opposing rescission, Pitts should now 
have the option of selling his shares to the corporation on the terms of 
the agreement. 62 
The court's holding in Pitts that noncompliance with sections 
78(1)(c)(ii) and (iii) renders a merger voidable, rather than void, indicates 
a general willingness to disregard corporate formalities where sharehold-
ers have actual knowledge of the merger proposal and informally approve 
54 See id. Pitts, however, did lose his stock purchase option because the court ruled that 
he failed to tender the option price, "in court or otherwise," before the option expired in 
1971. /d. at 536 n.12, 476 N .E.2d at 230 n.l2. 
55 /d. at 535, 476 N.E.2d at 229. The purpose of the merger was to raise additional capital 
for Halifax and would be defeated if Pitts were to receive 70.18% (or 94.46%, if the stock 
option is included) of Halifax's segregated assets. /d. 
56 Id. 
57 See id. at 535-36, 476 N.E.2d at 229. 
58 See id. at 533, 535-36, 476 N.E.2d at 228, 229-30. 
59 Id. at 535-36, 476 N.E.2d at 229. The court also observed that Henrich, on behalf of 
the corporation, dealt openly and fairly with Pitts during the negotiations for the sale of 
Pitts' shares. /d. 
60 /d. at 536, 476 N.E.2d at 230. 
61 /d. 
62 /d. at 537, 476 N.E.2d at 230. 
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it. This is consistent with previous Massachusetts decisions in other areas 
of corporate law where corporate actions taken without complying with 
corporate formalities were nevertheless held to be enforceable.63 Because 
it is unlikely that actual shareholder knowledge and an opportunity for 
informal approval will be present in large, publicly held corporations, the 
practical effect of Pitts will probably be confined to small, closely held 
corporations. 
The court's refusal to rescind the Halifax merger is important because 
it illustrates circumstances under which Massachusetts courts will uphold 
a merger effected in noncompliance with sections 78(c)(l)(ii) and (iii), 
despite a shareholder's objections. Pitts indicates that a court is unlikely 
to grant rescission where the shareholder knew about the impending 
merger and implicitly approved it by agreeing to sell his or her shares to 
the corporation, rendering technical compliance with sections 78(c)(l)(ii) 
and (iii) superfluous. In addition, Pitts demonstrates that the shareholder 
urging rescission cannot rely on formalistic arguments such as noncom-
pliance with the Statute of Frauds when asking a court to exercise its 
equitable powers. Finally, Pitts shows that a court is unlikely to grant 
rescission where the shareholder cannot demonstrate that he or she has 
suffered adverse economic consequences as a result of the merger. 
In summary, in Pitts v. Halifax Country Club, Inc., the appeals court 
held that a merger accomplished without complying with the require-
ments of sections 78(c)(l)(ii) and (iii) is voidable at the request of an 
injured shareholder, unless the shareholder is estopped by his or her own 
conduct from rescinding the merger. The court in Pitts refused to rescind 
the merger because the objecting shareholder did not suffer adverse 
economic consequences as a result of the merger. In deciding not to 
rescind the merger, the court considered it significant that prior to seeking 
rescission, the shareholder had entered into an oral agreement, subse-
quently unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, to sell his shares to 
63 See Trager v. Schwartz, 345 Mass. 653, 658-59, 189 N.E.2d 509, 512 (1963) (waiver of 
stock transfer restrictions on stock of small family corporation having three directors 
enforceable, despite absence of recorded vote by directors, where trust agreement stating 
plaintiff-director's intent to transfer stock to second director signed by plaintiff and third 
director); Samia v. Central Oil Co. of Worcester, 339 Mass. 101, 109, 158 N.E.2d 469, 474 
(1959) (deceased brother became shareholder in small family corporation prior to death, 
despite fact that stock certificates never issued to him and stock paid for by transfer of 
assets in which he had no interest, where family members agreed to issue him stock as 
gift); Anderson v. K.G. Moore, Inc., 6 Mass. App. Ct. 386, 390-91, 376 N.E.2d 1238, 
1241-42 (1978) (contract providing for plaintiff's resignation as officer and director of small 
family corporation in return for corporation's promise to repurchase his shares enforceable, 
despite absence of formal board approval, where all directors knew of contract and ac-
quiesced in it). 
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the corportation in order to effect the merger. The Pitts decision is 
significant because it demonstrates that noncompliance with sections 
78(c)(l)(ii) and (iii) may not be fatal to a merger, and because it illustrates 
circumstances under which a court will refuse to rescind a merger ef-
fected in violation of sections 78(c)(l)(ii) and (iii), despite a shareholder's 
objections. 
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